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The article presents a theoretical synthesis that could serve as the 
conceptual framework for empirical studies of the fulfilment of 
electoral pledges in modern democracies. Studies related to the 
program-to-policy linkage derived their hypotheses, for the most part, 
from an implicit, common sense model of mandate theory. The 
article presents a realistic version of positive mandate theory, one that 
is stripped of its normative assumptions and is suitable for empirical 
testing. It is informed by five theoretical building blocks: the concept 
of the binding mandate, the party theory of representation, the 
doctrine of responsible party government, modern normative 
mandate theory and the conceptual pair of delegation and mandate. 
The resulting framework incorporates the information content of the 
campaigns, the definiteness of the authorization and the strength of 
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In modern democracies politicians are criticized on a regular basis for breaking 
their campaign promises.
1
 It is widely believed that the pledge ‘read my lips: no new 
taxes’ cost George H. W. Bush the 1992 US presidential elections. The 
trustworthiness of the sitting president was called into question, even as he had made a 
seemingly honest attempt at reconciling his policy differences with Democrats in order 
to bring down the budget deficit. 
So why does the public sanction politicians set out to uphold the ‘public 
interest’? The answer lies in the role elections play in modern representative 
democracies. Elections provide a mandate (an at least partially bound authorization) 
to implement symbolic or policy-based pledges and act on salient issues. Any violation 
of this mandate may potentially backfire, even in cases where it is in line with some 
understanding of the public interest.  
Nevertheless, extant literature assigns a more complex role to elections in 
representative democracy. Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes (1999b: 16) consider 
elections to be the vehicle for both the (ex ante) expression of popular preferences 
and the (ex post) exercise of control over representatives (the mandate vs. the 
accountability role). Other approaches highlight the role of elections in selecting 
political leaders (Fearon, 1999). In a parallel, empirical literature (from Royed, 1996 
to Thomson et al., 2017) the rate of pledge-fulfilment is investigated in a range of 
comparative and country studies. These studies related to the so-called program-to-
policy linkage (Thomson, 2001) derived their hypotheses, for the most part, from an 
implicit, common sense model of mandate theory. 
What is missing in the literature is an attempt to bridge these two separate 
strands of research in an empirically testable theory of mandate-fulfilment. Whereas 
in most of the empirical literature electoral pledges are used as the main proxies for 
mandates, there is more to mandate-fulfilment than sheer pledge-fulfilment. The 
information content of the campaigns, the definiteness of the authorization and the 
strength of mandate enactment should all be core components of a testable theory of 
mandate-fulfilment.  
The article presents a theoretical synthesis (called a realistic version of positive 
mandate theory) that builds on these and other elements and could serve as the 
conceptual framework for empirical studies of the fulfilment of mandates in modern 
democracies. This allows not only for the combination of pledge-based (see: Royed, 
1996) and saliency-based (as in Budge and Hofferbert, 1990) empirical approaches 
but their embedding in a theoretical framework that is both more complex than 
implicit mandate theory and is informed by the rich tradition of conceptual thinking 
on the role of elections in a democracy. 
In the following we elaborate our model in four steps. First, we explore the five 
conceptual building blocks of our synthesis account. Second, we outline our proposed 
framework, the realistic version of positive mandate theory. Third, we discuss 
potential problems related to the internal and external validity of our theoretical 
framework. The final section summarizes our results and evaluates our contribution to 
the literature. 
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1. Conceptual Origins 
 
Empirical studies of pledges-fulfilment that develop, or at least rely on an 
explicit theory of the mandate are few and far between. Indeed, the literature on 
mandate theory on the one hand, and empirical pledge research on the other hand 
have remained largely in their respective silos. A good example for this is an article by 
Thomson et al. (2017) which summarizes multiple decades of empirical work in the 
field. Its brief introduction only offers a few theoretical references and the rest of the 
text is consecrated to empirical research.  
While the task of creating an empirical theory of mandate-fulfilment is far from 
straightforward, several strands in the representation and democratic theory literature 
offer clues for undertaking such a challenge of conceptualization and 
operationalization. Five approaches look particularly promising as potential building 
blocks for such an empirical framework: the theory of the bound and free mandate 
(Pitkin, 1967: 142–167), the party theory of representation (Judge, 1999: 70–71), the 
doctrine of responsible party government (Schattschneider, 1942), modern normative 
mandate theory (Manin, Przeworski and Stokes, 1999a) and the separation of 
delegation and mandate in the typology of political representation (Andeweg and 
Thomassen, 2005). In what follows, we provide a brief discussion of each of these 
building blocks. 
 
2. The Theory of the Bound and Free Mandate 
 
The concept of the mandate is closely related to both the theory of 
representative government and that of democracy. Classic accounts of the topic tend 
to draw a distinction between the binding (or ‘imperative’) and free mandates of the 
representatives. The binding mandate has traditionally provided democratic legitimacy 
to political institutions, while the free mandate has been a cornerstone of 
representative government.  
A key theorist of the former approach was Rousseau. In his reform proposal 
for the Constitution of Poland he was not only intent on maintaining the institution of 
delegation but went as far as to propose that deviating from the instructions given by 
the principals should be sanctioned by capital punishment (Rousseau, 1985 [1772]: 
xxiv). Edmund Burke, for his part, is often referred to as the founding father of the 
modern theory of the free mandate (cf. for example: Urbinati, 2006: 22). In his letter 
in 1774 to the Bristol electors he expressed the view that he would render them the 
best service if he was to exercise freely his powers of deliberation as opposed to 
slavishly following the opinion of people who elected him (Pitkin, 1967: 171). 
These two approaches had long existed in parallel in countries with a 
representative government. The turning point came on 8
th
 July, 1789, when the French 
Constituent Assembly ‘banned’ the binding mandate in the heat of a stormy debate 
(Fitzsimmons, 2002: 49). The ban on binding mandates has been ‘one of the central 
tenets of modern representative government’ (Pasquino, 2001: 205) ever since. The 
liberal parliamentarism of the 19
th
 century followed this tradition of the relative 
independence of representatives who enjoyed a mandate that was to free to at least 
some extent (Manin, 1997: 163). In practice, this was realized through rules explicitly 
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prohibiting fully binding mandates (which existed either in the form of legally binding 




 century voters increasingly tended to vote for parties as party 
affiliation trumped candidates’ personal qualities in electoral choice (even though this 
trend was less markedly manifest in the U.S. than in Europe). Instead of individual 
legislators, it was now the parties that increasingly became the subjects of 
representation. This process was captured in the theory of party representation (see: 
Judge, 1999: 71 and below). While representation had earlier been construed as a 
direct relationship of individuals (i.e. individual voters and individual representatives), 
when parties took center stage it was transformed into a relationship between 
aggregates of people (voters’ groups) on the one hand and representatives’ groups on 
the other. (We return to the more recent process of weakening party identification in 
the section on validity.) 
This party-centered form of representation sent the pendulum back from the 
free (personal) mandate towards a partial realization of a binding mandate. In 20
th
 
century politics (at least in Western Europe), parties’ election programs played a 
significant and empirically demonstrated role in shaping government policy (see the 
results of the Manifesto Research Group – McDonald and Budge (2005: 19). In this 
respect, and despite de jure prohibition, a de facto constraint for parties – the so-
called ‘outline-mandate’ (Frognier, 2000: 29) – was very much in effect. 
Despite these historical fluctuations of the dominant understanding of the 
mandate (both in theory and practice), it has been a relatively stable point of reference 
in representative government as an authorization that is binding to at least some 
extent. This generic mandate concept is content-specific and concrete, that is, it limits 
the scope of the strategic options available to the representative. This collective 
representative does not enjoy a blank check authorization – it does not become a 
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Figure 1. Conceptual levels of the electoral mandate 
 
 
Source: The authors. 
 
At the core we find the recipient of the mandate: a person or a party. As for its 
content, this mandate could be either implicitly or manifestly present in political 
debates. In the case of an explicit presentation of the mandate, its overall genre (an 
oral presentation, with a general approach focusing on symbolic proclamations as 
opposed to a written manifesto containing specific policy pledges) offers a further level 
of differentiation. Finally, the nature and structure of the written manifesto (such as 
the concreteness of the pledges and ‘testability’ of their fulfilment) allows for an even 
more detailed analysis (we will return to this figure in more detail). With the concept 
of the mandate briefly described, we now move on to the role of parties in 
representation theory as the ‘owners’ of this mandate. 
 
3. The Party Theory of Representation 
 
The historical process described above was characterized by an increasingly 
group-based representation. As political parties emerged as central players in the 
representative relationship the corresponding ‘party theory of representation’ was also 
developed in British political thought and elsewhere. According to Judge (1999: 71), it 
was born simply as a rationalization of existing practice, that of parties competing in 
elections on their respective electoral programs (‘manifestos’). This served a dual 
function. First, manifestos provide a common platform for the candidates of a party 
Recipient of the mandate: 
person or party 
Content of mandate: explicit 
or implied (e.g. ideology of 
the party) 
Features of pronounced 
pledges (bottom-up/top-
down; proactive/reactive, 
policy-related or rhetorical; 
manifesto or media etc.) 
Policy-oriented election 
manifesto: bundle of 
proactively and ex ante 
expressed pledges 
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and a distinguishing feature from the candidates of rival parties. Second, public policy 
pledges proved effective in mobilizing voters.  
According to this theory, the winning party receives an (at least partly) concrete 
authorization, or mandate to, implement the election program. This is the electoral 
mandate, a concept which – in Judge’s view – primarily served as a justification for the 
party discipline needed for governing in Parliament. This narrative also resolved a 
central problem of representation, i.e. that public representatives have a free mandate, 
while they also have a ‘natural’ yet legally non-enforceable duty to their constituency.  
Since party discipline regularly overwrote this relationship (and the personal 
judgement of the representative), the resulting tension had to be released by a 
reference to an alternative justification: the electoral mandate (Birch, 1964: 115-118; 
Judge, 1999: 70-71). In a corresponding development the electoral mandate has also 
been used to justify the policies of the (party) government for the electorate. Based on 
these considerations – and building on those of the previous section – the concept of 
the electoral mandate can be defined as an authorization by voters granted to parties 
to implement a specific set of policy pledges and other pre-established criteria once in 
government.  
 




 century political science the idea of the electoral mandate was not only 
developed in the context of the Westminster model but also in the American 
‘doctrine of responsible party government’ (APSA, 1950; Ranney, 1954; 
Schattschneider, 1942; Sundquist, 1988). Along with the party theory of 
representation this became the dominant empirical paradigm for understanding 
modern democracy from the 1940s to the 1970s. Both approaches sought to make 
sense of the principle of the sovereignty of the people and that of majority rule in 
modern states with extended populations. In this line of thought people’s sovereignty 
was interpreted not as the direct participation of the people, but as popular control 
over the government through the institution of the majority principle, and indirectly, 
through the role of the parties.  
Based on Ranney (1954: 12) and Judge (1999: 71) the ideal type of responsible 
party government can be summarized as follows. At least (and preferably, not more 
than) two politically consistent and disciplined parties have clear and definite political 
programs to put the popular will into action. During the election campaign each party 
tries to convince the majority of electors that its program is more congruent with the 
preferences or interests of the voters. The electorate votes not on the basis of 
individual qualities but according to the party affiliation of candidates. The party 
winning the most seats in the legislation gains complete control over government 
power and thus bears exclusive responsibility for policy-making. If the translation of its 
electoral manifesto into political practice is judged in a positive light, it will be re-
elected. If not, the opposition party will come into power at the next election.  
This doctrine of responsible party government can both be interpreted as a 
normative and as a gradually evolving positive (descriptive) framework of modern 
democracy. As an empirical theory it showed mixed results at best (e.g. Birch, 1964: 
119-120). In fact, Schattschneider (1942: 131-132) argued that the single most 
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important fact about American parties is that the ideal of responsible party 
government is not realized in practice. This criticism led to the development of a 
second-generation model of responsible party government. ‘Conditional party 
government’, as the new theory was called, highlighted a new precondition: the 
consistency of the preferences of the deputies of the same party. 
Despite its limitations, the descriptive model of responsible party government 
can be seen as a suitable empirical approximation of ideal typical mandate theory. 
This more realistic mandate framework is located between a strong theory of the 
mandate (one that is based on a binding mandate) on the one hand, and trusteeship, 
the other extreme position on the palette of principal-agent relationships (see: Table 1 
below).  
Table 1. The binding character of representative relationships 
Binding mandate  –  Partially binding mandate  –  Free mandate 
Delegation Constant 
responsiveness 




Source: The authors. 
 
The doctrine of responsible party government, therefore, could serve as a 
natural starting point for an empirically relevant theory of the mandate. Its greatest 
added value lies in the adoption of ‘weak mandate’, which fills the theoretical gap 
between the all-encompassing ex ante mandate and the lack of any ex ante constraints 
(ex post accountability and trusteeship – see: Table 1). Nevertheless, it also has two 
deficiencies, which make its further elaboration necessary. One is related to the 
complexity of voting decisions and the corresponding ambivalence surrounding the 
role of the elections. The other concerns the source of mandate content. We address 
these issues with a discussion of our two remaining theoretical building blocks. 
 
5. Modern Normative Mandate Theory 
 
The fourth theoretical source of our synthesis account is a modern normative 
version of mandate theory as presented by Manin et al. (1999a). One of the merits of 
this approach is that it embeds static representation theory in a dynamic framework by 
stressing the process-like nature of the mandate. Within this dynamic framework the 
moment of the elections is both the starting and closing point of the political process. 
Besides selecting representatives and offering the electorate a chance to ‘depose’ 
unworthy leaders, elections provide a chance to identify the public policies to be 
followed. Representative government is realized if the government pursues policies in 
line with the mandate received – if government policy is sensitive, or ‘responsive’ to 
the will of the electorate. Here, the will of the people is essentially equated with the 
public policy content of the authorization act (see: Figure 1).  
This framework effectively addresses the abovementioned requirement of the 
consistency of voting decisions over time. Representative government is not a 
synonym of responsive government: government policy is not a derivative of the 
changes in public opinion or popular preferences. This rendering of mandate theory 
places most of the emphasis on the role of elections. For better or worse, there are 
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further similarities with the party theory of representation and the doctrine of 
responsible party government. They all claim that fulfilling the mandate should go 
hand-in-hand with realizing the public interest. It is a normative prescription which 
does not logically follow from the assumptions of the models. In fact, it introduces an 
element of tension into the theoretical framework. 
This problem is also acknowledged by Manin et al. (1999b: 2-3): ‘From a 
normative standpoint, the question is why exactly would the institutions characteristic 
of representative democracy be conducive to’ the common good? The authors sketch 
four potential reasons: 1) Those who enter politics do so with the intention of serving 
the public good; 2) voters can effectively select these candidates; 3) voters can 
effectively threaten those who would stray from the path of virtue by throwing them 
out of office; 4) the institutional separation of powers limits deviations from acting in 
people’s best interests. 
It remains questionable how these conditions can be reconciled with an 
empirical mandate model of strong explanatory capacity. In fact, a number of 
theoretical approaches put a dent in this reasoning. These include studies on rational 
ignorance, political manipulation, as well as various public choice theories from rent-
seeking through the asymmetries of information all the way to Schumpeter’s 
asymmetric competence (‘infantilism’) and to political shirking. These considerations 
show that the unification of the notion of the public interest and that of the electoral 
mandate in a single logical framework may be unfeasible. While the dynamic aspects 
and the conceptualization of electoral choice of modern normative mandate theory 
may be useful additions to an empirical mandate theory, its normative aspects make it 
unsuitable for serving as the conceptual core for such an endeavor.  
 
6. Delegation and the Mandate in Representation Theory 
 
Another residual issue from our discussion of the doctrine of responsible party 
government concerned the source of mandate content (this issue was also raised 
implicitly with regards to the tension between sensitivity to public opinion and the 
electoral mandate). This conflict is explicit in the contrast between the responsiveness 
and mandate approaches as they imply different assumptions on the relationship 
between the electorate and its representatives. In the case of responsiveness, the 
content of the ‘contract’ is derived bottom-up from voters’ preferences (‘What do the 
people demand?’). In the case of mandate theory, the pivotal role of the electoral 
program signals a top-down relationship.  
This static distinction regarding the source of the mandate introduced by 
Andeweg and Thomassen (2005) is a useful addition to the dynamic approach put 
forward by Manin and his co-authors. The authors tackle the complex relationship 
between the electorate and its representatives in an idiosyncratic classification of 
representation-types (see: Table 2, which may be considered to be an elaboration on 
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Table 2. Modes of political representation 
 Control by voters 
Ex ante Ex post 
Defining the content 
of representation 
From the top Mandate Accountability 
From the bottom Delegation Responsiveness 
Source: Andeweg and Thomassen 2005: 512, as modified by the authors. 
 
The two dimensions of the conceptual matrix are related to controlling 
mechanisms and the definition of mandate content (here we only focus on the ex ante 
side of the table). We modified the table in one aspect: although Andeweg and 
Thomassen associate the upper left cell with ‘authorization’, we refer to it as the 
electoral mandate. We consider this term to be more accurate as the act of 
authorization also includes instances of blank check authorization, which is clearly 
inapplicable for an analysis of the content of representation.  
As is manifested in this presentation, the mandate approach to representation is 
characterized by a top-down approach to creating the content of the principal-agent 
understanding. Delegation, on the other hand, realizes representation from the 
bottom up, as the government process takes its cues from detailed, binding 
expressions of the popular will. It is important to note, however, that delegation can 
only be realized when a number of very strict conditions are met: voters must have 
exogenous and stable preferences and the political agenda must be predictable. In this 
sense, the more flexible framework of the mandate relationship is also more realistic. 
 
7. An Empirical Theory of Mandate-fulfilment 
 
In this article, we argued that there is a missing link between various theories of 
the mandate and empirical pledge-research. An empirically testable theory of 
mandate-fulfilment remains elusive even as a number of its potential components are 
well exposed in the conceptual literature. The previous section enumerated five such 
building blocks and in this section, we discuss these approaches with a view towards 
constructing a synthesis framework that is in direct conversation with empirical studies 
of pledge-fulfilment.  
Our proposition takes away five key elements – five major criticisms – from the 
analysis so far. It builds on the ‘weak’ concept of the mandate. It treats parties as the 
main agents of representation. It makes use of the realistic tendencies of party 
government (without its reliance on its most prohibitive preconditions). It sets up a 
positive framework for studying representative government (doing away with 
normative elements). And finally, it relies on a top-down approach to ex ante 
authorization. We call this synthesis the realistic version of positive mandate theory. 
Table 3 provides a summary of its major aspects.  
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Table 3. The strong and realistic versions of mandate theory 
 Subject Feature Strong version Realistic version 
1 Mandate Binding character 
of the mandate 
Strong Weak 












by party elite) 
5 Authorization Strength of 
authorization 
Majority Majority or plurality 









3 Implementation Policy change in 
the wake of 
government defeat 
Radical Not necessarily radical 





No public interest 
condition (positive 
approach) 
Source: The authors. 
 
The first feature is the acknowledgment of the fact that for any mandate theory 
there should be a clearly defined concept of the mandate. Here, the mandate is an 
electoral authorization that is binding to some extent. The free ‘mandate’ (a blank 
authorization for the representative using elections as an ex post control mechanism) 
is an authorization only in a purely formal sense. The weak version of mandate theory 
puts the emphasis on the under-defined character of any real-life mandate as opposed 
to stronger versions of an all-encompassing character. 
The weak version of mandate theory disposes of the notion of a binding 
mandate-fulfilment that covers the totality of policy issues. This weak mandate as 
binding to some extent is content-based and specific: it delineates the scope of action. 
On the one hand, the various conceptual levels of the mandate (see: Figure 1) create 
ample space for ambiguity and missing information. On the other hand, the partially 
binding character of the weak mandate also means that the ends – the perceived 
public interest – may not fully, and in all cases, justify the means.  
For the problem of the source of the mandate we rely on the representation 
typology of Andeweg and Thomassen. In our modified presentation, we equated the 
ex ante top-down approach with the mandate. In this case, the content of 
representation (e.g., in the form of an election program) is defined by the 
political/party elites, as opposed to the exogenous preferences of the voters. This 
lends strategic room for maneuver for party leaders as they decide on the structural 
aspects and key pledges of the manifesto. 
Moving on from the mandate formulation to the authorization phase of the 
political process, the realism of our approach is also highlighted by the fact that it does 
not assume that only overwhelming election victories provide a workable mandate. In 
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fact, it treats all party configurations capable of forming a government as ‘winners’ and 
expects them to fulfil their collection of pledges.  
In modern mass democracies, authorization is not conferred by individual 
voters, but by a plurality or majority of voters. Similarly, the beneficiaries of 
authorization are also collective actors (in most cases: parties). The realistic approach 
to responsible party government renders the complexity inherent in ‘strong’ versions 
of mandate theory manageable. In the ‘strong’ ideal type of responsible party 
government only two parties compete. This setting mobilizes the electorate by 
providing the simplest choice possible: one between two clearly defined alternatives.  
Multiparty systems defy these preconditions just as party platforms are 
incomplete or ill-defined. The mandate may be implicit (with party ideology used as a 
pointer) or explicit, and even in the explicit case it may be devoid of content on most 
policy domains. Similarly, the realistic version of mandate theory, as opposed to the 
strong one, does not require a radical change of direction in terms of public policy 
compared to the previous government led by the other competing party. As manifesto 
content may overlap, pledges and saliency may be shared between parties; thus this 
unrealistic requirement is omitted.  
Besides realism, the positive-empirical ambition of our proposed synthesis is 
also in stark contrast with extant mandate theories. This approach circumvents the 
problem of normativity that upsets the logical structure of stronger versions of 
mandate theory. To illuminate the necessity of this adjustment, we briefly revisit the 
key features of modern normative mandate theory.  
In the footsteps of the doctrine of responsible party government, the most 
salient feature of normative mandate theory is that representative government also 
entails governing in the public interest (Manin et al., 1999a; Pitkin, 1967). For this to 
happen, three descriptive (1-3) and two normative (4-5) assumptions should be met 
(Manin et al., 1999a: 30-33): 
 
1) Election campaigns provide relevant information about the policies to be 
pursued (‘informativity’);  
2) Voters expect that the government policy will be identical to election pledges 
– politicians will adhere to and fulfil their promises; 
3) Voters are steadfast, i.e. that they will stand by their preferences (expressed 
through the elections) throughout the political cycle; 
4) Pursuing the successful election program, i.e. the ‘mandate’, always serves 
the best interests of the electorate; 
5) The interests of elected representatives coincide with those of the voters. 
 
For our present purposes, the most important normative assumption is related 
to the correspondence of the mandate and the public interest (4). This postulate 
introduces an external element into the original theoretical framework which upsets its 
logical coherence. The theoretical basis for this correspondence is the utilitarian 
understanding of the public interest: the common good is what is good for the 
‘public’, ‘for the people’ (in a technical sense: the median voter). And what is good for 
the people can be learned from their revealed preferences, from the choices people 
make. This utilitarian interpretation of the common good is questionable in itself. 
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From our perspective, however, the key objection is that preferences are not set over 
time and, therefore, the positions expressed earlier will not represent ‘the best 
interests of the people’ in the period following the election (cf. condition 3). Given 
that elections are held every few years, the explicit content of the mandate and the 
voters’ revealed preferences (cf. responsiveness) can soon get into conflict, which 
upsets the internal structure of the five conditions.  
At this point, theorists face two imperfect options to choose from. The first 
option is to dissolve the concept of the mandate – interpreted as an electoral 
authorization with a partially developed content – in the more general notion of 
responsiveness. This negates the pivotal role of elections in representative democracy. 
The other option is to separate the positive-descriptive elements (‘Was the pledge 
fulfilled?’) from the normative and prescriptive elements (‘Does [meeting] the 
promise serve the public interest?’). As our aim was to build an empirically testable 
theory of mandate fulfilment, we opted for the second alternative. This choice was 
also supported by considerations related to research methodology (cf. the problems 
inherent in operationalizing the concept of the public interest). 
 
Operationalization and validity 
 
Our final task in the process of formulating the empirical theory of mandate 
fulfilment is the operationalization of the realistic version of positive mandate theory. 
This realistic version simplifies the all-encompassing character of the strong ideal type 
by means of a series of compromises. What is gained in the process is a compact, yet 
empirically relevant theoretical framework. Its main components are not only 
theoretically informed but they are also in direct conversation with multiple empirical 
research agendas.  
The operationalized rendition of the empirical theory of mandate fulfilment 
consists of three main research topics and the related research questions and 
empirical indicators. These are the information content of the mandate and 
campaigns; the definiteness of the authorization; and the strength of mandate 
implementation. Taken together, the three related theory-research question-
measurement bundles provide an empirically testable theory of mandate-fulfilment. 
Table 4 provides an overview of the structure of this synthesis framework.  
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Table 4. Empirical research questions derived from the theoretical framework 
Theoretical problems Research questions Empirical indicators 
I. Information content 
of the mandate 
(campaigns) 
(1) How informed are 
voters of the mandate 
proposals? 
The depth of the factual knowledge of 
voters of party manifestos 
(2) How 
comprehensive and 
concrete is the 
mandate? 
The length and comprehensiveness of 
election program 
The specificity of the pledges  
II. Definiteness of the 
authorization 
(3) How strong is the 
authorization? 
Activity rate of voters (election turnout) 
Vote share of winning program(s) (the 
degree of victory) 
(4) How unique is the 
authorization? 
Differences between the two election 
program 
III. The strength of 
mandate 
implementation 
(5) How clear is the 
responsibility for 
implementation? 
The extent of the constitutional 
separation of powers 
The strength of party discipline 
Other formal constraints (e.g. the 
electoral system) and informal constraints 
(6) What is the rate of 
mandate fulfilment? 
Pledge enactment in terms of percentages 
(‘pledge approach’) 
Enactment of the major, recurring 
provisions of the programme (‘saliency 
approach’) 
Source: The authors. 
 
The first pillar in the framework concerns the information content of the 
mandate. In democratic countries with free and fair elections campaigns offer a wide 
variety of information sources for the electorate on the possible content of 
representation relationships. Parties often publish explicit manifestos revealing their 
ideological orientations and policy intentions. Even in cases where a written program 
is missing, oral statements may effectively provide a substitute. Proactive 
communications may be supplemented by reactions to proposals by other parties. 
This issue may be further divided into two parts with each of its empirical research 
questions: the knowledge of the electorate of the proposals on offer and the 
information content of the mandate proper. The former may be investigated in 
research designs aimed at the depth of the factual knowledge of voters. The latter can 
be investigated by an analysis of the comprehensiveness and concreteness of 
manifestos as well as by the specificity of individual pledges. 
The second pillar of the framework is related to the definiteness of the 
authorization. This both concerns the strength of authorization and its uniqueness. 
The strength of authorization is measurable in a direct manner with turnout and 
electoral results while uniqueness is a function of the differences between party 
manifestos. This latter could be measured by the share of overlapping and 
idiosyncratic pledges of the total. 
The third pillar of the framework concerns the strength of mandate 
implementation. This is the topic that is at the forefront of most of empirical pledge 
research. Yet even this aspect requires a more complex empirical research agenda in 
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order to elevate the level of abstraction from pledge to mandate fulfilment. The clarity 
of responsibility when it comes to implementing the mandate is both a function of 
formal and informal constraints. Prime examples of the former are constitutional rules 
regarding the separation of powers. Informal constrains may include cultural norms 
which often contribute to the strength or weakness of party discipline. Finally, the rate 
of mandate fulfilment may be calculated by analyzing the rate of pledge fulfilment (in 
percentages of the total) or the enactment of major legislation regarding recurring 
provisions of electoral programs (see: the ‘saliency approach’).  
The empirical theory of mandate fulfilment – as defined by the pillars of Table 
4 and the related discussion – needs further refinements before it can be directly 
applied to country case studies or comparative work. These mostly concern the 
institutional variety of electoral systems and the distinctive characteristics of party 
systems of various advanced democracies. In our presentation of the theoretical 
framework above we argued that the enforcement of the authorization (i.e. 
representation) is realized by collective actors, in most cases parties. We also 
contended that whichever party ‘wins’ the election should be held accountable 
according to its pledges and other mandate-relevant proclamations.  
Needless to say, the notion of ‘winning’ does not adequately prepare our 
theoretical framework for empirical application. A general discussion of the effect on 
mandate-fulfilment of major regime types (presidential vs. parliamentary), electoral 
systems (majority vs. proportional) and party systems (two-party vs. multi-party 
systems) is therefore in order. We simplify this complexity to four models: the 
baseline scenario of the Westminster system, the plurality of European proportional 
systems (here approximated by the Dutch case), minority governments in 
parliamentary systems and U.S. presidentialism. 
The Westminster model (here proxied by the political system of the United 
Kingdom) can be considered the baseline case for the empirical application of the 
proposed framework. Single-party governments are common (it is important to note 
that the proposed framework does not rely on any notion of the ‘majority of the 
popular vote’, which is not a precondition of forming a government in most countries 
anyway). As a general rule, manifestos are a must – and they have a real effect on both 
electoral results (see: the election of 2017) and government policy (as was the case 
with the election of 1997). Pledges and issue emphases tend to be party-specific and 
their implementation is frequently fodder for political debate. 
Proportional electoral systems are a harder nut to crack (not counting single-
party majority governments or coalition governments where one party has a majority 
on its own). As a general rule, the respective mandate content associated with 
participant parties adds up to form the government program. This is a relatively clear-
cut solution for empirical research whenever pledges and issue emphases are not 
antagonistic (not to mention the cases where there is a clear overlap between coalition 
partners). In fact, coalition agreements can be understood as joint efforts of coalition 
participants to reconstruct the mandate (e.g. pledges that both parties share or at least 
no party objects to).  
The empirical framework addresses these problems under the heading of the 
uniqueness of authorization and the clarity of responsibility (see: Table 4, research 
questions 4 and 5). In cases where conflicting mandate proposals are retained even 
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after forming a coalition the corresponding scores for uniqueness and clarity will 
decrease. As for minority governments in parliamentary systems, they need other 
parties’ votes for passing legislation. In this respect they behave similarly to 
proportional systems from the perspective of our theoretical framework with one 
exception: the mandate proposal of ‘supporting’ opposition parties will not be 
considered the way those of junior coalition partners would as they do not take part 
formally (‘responsibly’) in party government. 
Finally, the case of U.S. presidentialism, with its elaborate separation of powers 
structure, and other federal states necessitate further refinements of our theoretical 
framework. Once again, when both houses and the presidency are under one-party 
control (as in 2008-2010 and 2016-2018, for instance) the only difference with the 
one-party Westminster-type government lies in the fragmented sources of the 
mandate. Recent political history points towards the pre-eminence of presidential 
campaigns as agenda-setters in the political process and, therefore, a realistic mandate 
theory would primarily rely on the explicit or implicit manifestos of major presidential 
contenders. As for the cases of divided government (Congress vs. the presidency or 
when the two houses are divided in terms of party control) they once again restrict the 
validity of an empirical mandate theory (see: ‘clear responsibility’ in Table 4). 
Certainly, this brief discussion of real-life political systems does not offer a 
point-by-point solution to all potential problems of the operationalization of a 
framework for specific research questions, countries and periods. Nevertheless, it also 
shows that the proposed realistic mandate framework is flexible enough to 
accommodate designs related to at least a fair share of electoral, party and 




In this article, we have presented an empirical theory of mandate-fulfilment in 
advanced representative democracies. In creating what we called the realistic version 
of positive mandate theory we started our discussion with the notion of the partially 
binding mandate, as contrasted with the free mandate approach to representation. In 
the next step, we defined the representation relationship as one established between 
collective actors and where the subjects of representation are parties. We also added 
the core concepts of responsible party government and modern normative mandate 
theory to our analysis. However, we proposed a number of adjustments to these 
frameworks in order to arrive at a realistic and positive version of mandate theory.  
Most importantly, the proposed framework breaks with both normative and 
‘strong’ renderings of mandate theory, for both theoretical and practical reasons 
(plausibility, internal validity and suitability for operationalization – see Table 3 for a 
summary of these adjustments). The result of this theoretical survey is a conceptual 
framework that is both logically coherent and empirically plausible, and which can be 
verified or refuted by the tools of positive political science (as indicated in Table 4).  
We conclude our analysis by highlighting the contributions of this empirical 
mandate theory to the extant literature. First, in this article we argued that there has 
been no attempt to bridge theoretical accounts of the mandate with the empirical 
research agenda of pledge-fulfilment. We also contended that there is more to 
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mandate-fulfilment than sheer pledge-fulfilment – and that a theoretically relevant 
empirical research agenda should concern the former, not the latter. Furthermore, we 
stipulated that the three main components of our empirical model (information, 
definiteness and strength of implementation) are not only theoretically informed but 
are also in direct conversation with multiple empirical research agendas. 
The most compelling example for this is the isolation of the saliency- and 
pledge-oriented approaches to studying mandate-fulfilment even as these clearly 
represent two sides of the same coin. There is also an abundance of examples as to 
how variables from empirical pledge research could fit seamlessly into our framework. 
In his review of the pledge literature of the preceding two decades, Sebők (2016: 149) 
provides a comprehensive list of the variables used in these studies.  
Information on the mandate are regularly described by their policy content 
(‘context area’), their direction (‘expand or cut taxes’) or the groups favored by the 
policy. The role of citizens’ evaluations has also been studied recently (Thomson, 
2011). A number of other variables – such as legislative majority and consensus 
between manifestos – are related to the second pillar concepts of authorization and 
uniqueness. Finally, the analysis of the strength of mandate-fulfilment went beyond 
counting pledge-fulfilment to include various institutional features (e.g. ministerial 
control) as control factors. The fact that these variables are regularly used in pledge 
research without invoking their roots in mandate theory is a reminder that an 
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